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CRIMINAL LAW-THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT: DE­
FENDANT'S FRIEND OR FOE? COMMONWEALTH v. BASTARACHE, 1980 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2465, 414 N.E.2d 984. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of standards used to determine whether a jury 
is constitutionally composed is of both historic and current interest. 1 
The recent Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Bastarache2 il­
lustrates judicial attempts to formulate standards that accommodate 
different constitutional interests. 
On May 26, 1978, twenty-year-old Mark E. Bastarache was in­
volved in a bar brawl as a result of which Pete Wilbur, the individual 
with whom Bastarache was fighting, died.3 A grand jury, sitting in 
Franklin County, Massachusetts, indicted Bastarache for man­
slaughter.- Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the indict­
ment and the jury pool on the grounds that persons between the ages 
of eighteen and thirty-four had been underrepresented in the Frank­
lin County jury venire since 1970.4 The motion was denied at a pre­
trial hearing and Bastarache was later tried before a jury and found 
guilty of manslaughter.s 
The appeals court, in reversing the superior court, relied prima­
rily on defendant's constitutional challenge to the composition of the 
jury poo1.6 The supreme judicial court upheld the reversal but on 
different grounds.7 The supreme judicial court disagreed with the 
1. The text and footnotes that follow demonstrate that the constitutionality ofjury 
composition has been of interest to courts, legislatures, and commentators for decades. 
2. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2465,414 N.E.2d 984. 
3. Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1729, 1731-32,409 
N.E.2d 796,799. 
4. Id. at 1733, 409 N.E.2d at 799-800. 
5. Id. at 1729,409 N.E.2d at 798. 
6. The conviction was appealed on four grounds, including the challenge to the 
composition of the jury pool. The other three grounds were based on objections to the 
evidentiary rulings and instructions of the superior court judge relating to: (1) The ad­
mission of autopsy photographs; (2) the instructions on self-defense; and, (3) the Com­
monwealth's theory of wanton and reckless conduct. Id. at 1732, 409 N.E.2d at 799. 
7. The supreme judicial court agreed with the appeals court that 
[T]he autopsy photographs of the victim's brain and of the interior of his skull 
after the brain was removed were inflammatory, graphic, and grisley; . : . the 
defendant's claim of self-defense would not have been foreclosed by a finding 
that the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was drunk: and 
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appeals court's conclusion "that the age group (eighteen-to-thirty­
four) was underrepresented in violation of the Sixth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States."8 In rejecting the sixth 
amendment challenge, the supreme judicial court found that "classi­
fications based on age alone do not involve identifiable or distinctive 
groups for Federal constitutional purposes and that the jury lists in 
Franklin County were not deficient under the Constitution of the 
United States."9 
II. THE DECISION 
Bastarache's arguments before the Massach~setts Supreme Ju­
dicial Court encompassed both sixth and fourteenth amendment fed­
eral constitutional concerns. \0 Grand jury indictments are not 
constitutionally required of the states as a necessary prerequisite to 
state criminal trials; thus, the challenge to the grand jury indictment 
is subject only to equal protection analysis under the fourteenth 
amendment. 11 A challenge to the composition of the petit jury, how­
ever, falls within the purview of the sixth amendment. 12 
In defining the constitutional test to be applied under the four­
teenth amendment, the court relied solely on Castaneda v. Partida: 13 
The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recogniz­
able, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the 
laws, as written or as applied. Next, there must be a demonstra­
tion of disproportionate underrepresentation over a significant pe­
riod of time. Finally, if the selection procedure is susceptible of 
abuse or is not racially neutral, the statistical showing supports the 
presumption of discrimination. 14 
The sixth amendment test relied upon by the supreme judicial court 
susceptible to injury; [and] ... no charge should have been given based on the 
theory of wanton and reckless conduct. . . . . 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2482-84, 414 N.E.2d at 996-97. 
8. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2466, 414 N.E.2d at 987. 
9. Id. at 2478, 414 N.E.2d at 993. 
10. Id. at 2467, 414 N.E.2d at 987,988. 
11. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884). 
12. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ...." U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI. The sixth amendment right to an impartial jury applies to state criminal 
trials through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Loui­
siana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1968). 
13. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
14. Id. at 494. 
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in Bastarache was found in Duren v. Missouri: 15 
[To establish a] prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section 
requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged 
to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that 
the representation of this group in venires from which juries are 
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of 
such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresenta­
tion is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selec­
tion process. 16 
The supreme judicial court then concluded that, although the show­
ing of a disparate impact on a group is necessary under both amend­
ments, differences exist between the tests in both the first and third 
steps. 
The first step contemplates the establishment of a distinctive 
group for sixth amendment purposes and the establishment of an 
identifiable group for fourteenth amendment purposes. The court 
noted that "[tJhe focus of the equal protection clause has been on 
classes that have historically been saddled with disabilities or sub­
jected to unequal treatment,"17 while the sixth amendment's concern 
is "the broader principle that juries should be drawn from a source 
fairly representative of the community."18 The court then deter­
mined that, for the purposes of the first step, it may be easier to find 
a distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes than an identifi­
able group for fourteenth amendment equal protection purposes. 19 
The second step in both tests requires evidence that the group, 
established in step one, was disproportionately represented in the 
jury venire. The third step requires a showing that the dispropor­
tionate underrepresentation is the result of systematic exclusion.20 
The different treatment given this third step is characterized by the 
supreme judicial court in the following manner: "Equal protection, 
for the purposes of the case before us (i.e., one not based on race), 
requires a showing that the selection procedure is susceptible of 
abuse, while the Sixth Amendment requires a showing that the un­
derrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the 
15. 439 U.s. 357 (1979). 
16. Id. at 364. For a discussion of proof of systematic exclusion, see Comment, 
"Jury-mandering'~· Federal Jury Selection and the Generation Gal', 59 IOWA L. REV. 401, 
404-07 (1973). 
17. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See Comment, supra note 16, at 403-05. 
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selection process."21 
Once the prima facie case has been established, the burden of 
proof then shifts to the state; that burden is defined differently for 
each amendment: 
Equal protection principles allow the State to show an absence of 
intent to discriminate, while the Sixth Amendment test appears to 
involve less a question of intent than a showing that there were 
significant interests served by the selection process that resulted in 
the exclusion or underrepresentation of a distinctive group.22 
The above distinctions, drawn in Bastarache, are academic for 
purposes of the case before the court. The supreme judicial court's 
holding that "youth" constitutes neither a distinctive, nor an identifi­
able, group precludes further inquiry into the constitutional chal­
lenge. Through dicta the court hypothesized the arguments the state 
could make that would be sufficient to rebut a prima facie case estab­
lished under each amendment. 23 
The supreme judicial court's holding that youth does not consti­
tute a cognizable group places Bastarache24 clearly within the main­
stream of both state and federal decisions.25 The court's treatment of 
youth is disturbing in light of the statement that "a group might con­
stitute a 'distinctive' group in the community for Sixth Amendment 
purposes but not an 'identifiable' group for equal protection 
purposes."26 
If the Bastarache distinction is accurate, the question becomes: 
What factors must be considered to find a group distinctive for sixth 
amendment purposes, but not identifiable for fourteenth amendment 
purposes? The Bastarache court correctly noted that broader protec­
tion should be afforded the individual under the sixth amendment 
than under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 
This note examines the hypothesis that the Bastarache distinction of 
group identity between these amendments is essentially meaningless 
21. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992. 
22. Id. at 2475-76,414 N.E.2d at 992. 
23. See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2478-79, 414 N.E.2d at 993. 
24. For articles addressing the issue of whether youth should constitute a cogniza­
ble group under present judicial analysis, see Zeigler, Young Adults As A Cognizable 
Group in Jury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1045 (1978); Comment, supra note 16; Com­
ment, The Exclusion Of Young Adults From Juries: A Threat to Jury Impartiality, 66 J. 
CRIM. L. & C. 150 (1975). 
25. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2476 n.lO, 414 N.E.2d at 992-93 n.lO. See generally 
Zeigler, supra note 24. 
26. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992. 
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and will suggest a more meaningful way to distinguish the different 
interests of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT 
A. Historical Basis 
The belief that the sixth and fourteenth amendments contem­
plate protection of different interests and, therefore, demand differ­
ent tests can be substantiated through an examination of their 
geneses. 
The sixth amendment, from its inception, extended greater pro­
tection to the individual. The individual, previously afforded the 
right to due process of law by the fifth amendment,27 was given the 
right to an impartial jury trial. This is more than the "right" to a 
trial, but the right to a "judgment of [one's] peers."28 
The sixth amendment finds its roots in language found within 
Article III of the United States Constitution.29 The language of Arti­
cle III was derived from the Magna Charta, in which it was declared, 
"that no man shall be arrested, nor imprisoned, nor banished, nor 
deprived of life, &c., but by the judgement of his peers, or by the law 
of the land."30 It then can be inferred that the sixth amendment's 
"impartial jury" was a transposition of the language of the Magna 
Charta that required 'Judgement of [one's] peers." 
The fourteenth amendment historically has been focused on dif­
27. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. . . nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offense to be twice in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be com.eelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
28. See notes 30, 34 & 40 infra. 
29. The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by 
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State, where the said Crimes shall have 
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at 
such Place or Places as the Congress may by law have directed. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
30. J. STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 228 (1854) (quoting the Magna Charta). In Justice Story's study of the Constitu­
tion, he stated that 
[t)he judgement of his peers here alluded to, and commonly called, in the 
quaint language offormer times, a trial perpais, or trial by the country, is the 
trial by a jury, who are called the peers of the party accused, being of the like 
condition and equality in the state. Id. 
The sixth amendment was added, therefore, according to Justice Story "[i)n order to 
secure this great paladium of liberty, the trial by jury, in criminal cases, from all possibil­
ity of abuse. . . which add greatly to the original constitutional barriers against persecu­
tion and oppression." Id. at 230. 
322 WESTERN NEW ENGLANIJ LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:317 
ferent concerns. Historical analysis indicates that the fourteenth 
amendment had a dual purpose. It was intended to protect the rights 
of groups from unjustifiable and invidious discriminations. The 
fourteenth amendment also made due process protections found 
within the fifth amendment applicable to the states. The fourteenth 
amendment, in general, entitled individuals in criminal matters, "the 
right of trial, according to the process and proceedings of the com­
mon law."3! 
The "concerns of equality and even-handedness in governmen­
tal action" is the underlying thrust of the fourteenth amendment's 
equal protection clause.32 The clause fundamentally addresses the 
struggle between individuals seeking equality and the government's 
right to legislate laws that classify.33 
The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause is directed 
at collective protection whereas the sixth amendment's focus is on 
the protection of individuals.34 The courts, generally, have not 
31. Id. at 233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I states in part: 

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any per­

son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 

Id. 
32. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991 (1978). 
33. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 
343-44 (1949). 
34. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has also been relied on in 
evaluating jury composition cases. See generally United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307 
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United 
States v. Deardorff, 343 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Gargan, 314 F. 
Supp. 414 (W.D. Wis. 1970), affd sub. nom. United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972). 
The fourteenth amendment's due process clause is not necessarily different from the 
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. u[T)he due process clauses of the fifth 
and fourteenth amendments have [also) been held to yield norms of equal treatment 
indistinguishable from those of the equal protection clause." L. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 
992. The due process clause, however, is historically distinguishable from the "impartial 
jury" language of the sixth amendment. 
In a discussion of the fifth amendment's due process language, Justice Story indi­
cated that it also derives from the Magna Charta. J. STORY, supra note 3D, at 233. The 
roots of the due process clause may be found in the language U[n)either will we pass upon 
him, or condemn him, but by the lawful judgement of his peers, or by the law of the 
land." Id. In particular, 
these latter words, 'by the law of the land' mean, by due process of law; that is, 
without due presentment or indictment, and being brought in to answer thereto 
by due process of the common law. So that this clause, in effect, affirms the 
right of trial, according to the process and proceedings of the common law. 
Id. 
The "due process" clause also exists within the fourteenth amendment. Utilizing 
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adopted this historical analysis. "Indeed, the reasoning that prohib­
its the arbitrary exclusion of cognizable classes from jury service has 
been fundamentally the same whatever the constitutional context."35 
It is the contention of this note that the sixth amendment's impartial 
jury requirement has been consumed by the filtering effect of the 
fourteenth amendment thereby reducing it to the interests of equal 
protection and due process. The result will be future cases similar to 
Bastarache, in which the court fails to constitutionally condemn 
practices that preclude an individual's right to a judgment by a jury 
of his peers. 
B. Judicial Development 
Courts have looked primarily to the jury's composition to deter­
mine whether the defendant has been given his right to an impartial 
jury trial. This right presently is characterized as the right to jury 
representation by a fair cross-section of the community.36 The tests 
that have developed to determine whether this right has been pro­
tected are derived from several sources. 
In addition to the sixth and fou~eenth amendments, challenges 
to jury composition have been brought under the fifth amendment to 
the United States Constitution,37 under the United States Supreme 
Court's supervisory power over federal courts,38 and, since 1968, 
under the federal Jury Selection and Service Act.39 
The right ofa criminal defendant to an impartial jury was noted 
in the context of a sixth amendment decision made in 1888 by the 
United States Supreme Court.40 In 1968, the United States Supreme 
normal rules of statutory construction, it is obvious that ''judgement of his peers" and 
"law of the land" have separate meanings. Likewise, the right to an "impartial jury" and 
the right to "due process of law" contemplate different interests. 
35. State v. Jenison, 405 A.2d 3, 7 (R.I. 1979). A challenge was brought in Jenison 
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to a statute that resulted in the total exclu­
sion of members of the academic community from the jury pool. The court held that the 
academic community constituted a cognizable group, and that its exclusion, without a 
rational justification, was a violation of the fair cross-section requirement. 
36. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975). 
37. See cases cited note 34 supra. 
38. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pa­
cific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). 
39. 28 U.S.c. §§ 1861-69 (1968), as amended by Jury Selection and Service Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 54. See also Comment, supra note 16. 
40. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). 
Except in that class or grade of offences [sic] called petty offences [sic], which, 
according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any 
tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury 
to the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted either in the name, or by or 
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Court applied the right to an impartial jury trial in criminal cases to 
the states through the fourteenth amendment.41 This right was de­
fined further by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana,42 where 
the Court held that "the selection of a petit jury from a representa­
tive cross section of the community is an essential component of the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."43 
Taylor's cross-section requirement finds its roots in a case tried 
more than one hundred years ago. In Strauder v. West Virginia,44 a 
black defendant challenged a state law that prohibited blacks from 
participating on juries. The United States Supreme Court concluded 
that the prohibition infringed upon defendant's right to a fair trial45 
and upon members of the excluded class.46 The Court held this to be 
a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.47 
This equal protection concern with a defendant's right to fair 
trial became more focused in a 1940 Supreme Court decision. In 
Smith v. Texas,48 a black defendant challenged a practice that re­
sulted in the exclusion of blacks from jury service.49 The Court held 
the practice to be a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal 
protection clause. 50 In language frequently cited, the Court stated: 
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instru­
ments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative 
of the community. For ... discrimination to result in the exclu­
sion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only vio­
lates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war 
under the authority of, the United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that 
mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for 
the offence [sic) charged. 
Id. at 557. 
41. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan, petitioner challenged 
the validity of a Louisiana constitutional provision that denied his request for a jury trial. 
Petitioner was tried and convicted of simple battery, a misdemeanor. Louisiana permit­
ted jury trials only in cases where capital punishment, or a hard labor sentence could be 
imposed. 
42. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
43. Id. at 528. 
44. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
45. Id. at 308-09. 
46. Id. at 308. 
47. Id. at 310. 
48. 311 U.S. 128 (1940). 
49. In Harris County, Texas, blacks constituted over 20% of the population, yet in 
the years 1931 through 1938, there never had been more than two black persons on the 
grand jury in any given year. Only five of the 384 grand jurors who served during that 
period were black. Id. at 128-29. 
50. Id. at 132. 
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with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representa­
tive government.51 
Smith more clearly defined, in equal protection terms, the inter­
est to be guarded. The jury must be "a body truly representative of 
the community."52 This concept was further refined through a tri1­
ogy of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the ex­
ercise of its supervisory powers over juries in fede~al courts. 
The first case in the tri1ogy, Glasser v. United States,53 held that 
the practice of adding women to jury rolls solely from lists furnished 
by t~e Illinois League of Women Voters violated defendant's right to 
an impartialjury.54 In determining the requirements for state provi­
sion of this right,· the Court concluded that the jury must represent a 
"cross-section of the community."55 
The two cases that followed, Thiel v. Southern Pac!ftc Co. 56 and 
Ballard v. United States ,57 echoed Glasser's mandate in requiring 
that jury lists be representative of a cross-section of the community. 
In Thiel, a jury venire was stricken due to its exclusion of all who 
worked for a daily wage;58 in Ballard, the Court condemned the ex­
clusion of women from grand and petit juries.59 
By 1946, the requirement that a jury be drawn from a fair cross­
section of the population had become entrenched. Although contro­
versy surrounds the source of the fair cross-section requirement,60 
the better analysis attributes it to the province of the fourteenth 
amendment.61 Strauder and Smith clearly were decided under this 
amendment.62 Glasser, Thiel, and Ballard were decided by exercise 
of the Supreme Court's supervisory power.63 These decisions, taken 
51. Id. at 130 (footnote omitted). 
52. Id. 
53. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
54. 315 U.S. at 86. 
55. Id. 
56. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). 
57. 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
58. 328 U.S. at 221-22. 
59. 329 U.S. at 193-94. 
60. See notes 73-77 infra and accompanying text. 
61. At least one court observed that the reasoning in jury composition cases is es­
sentially the same regardless of the context in which the constitutional challenge is 
brought. State v. Jenison, 405 A.2d 3, 7 (R.I. 1979); see text accompanying note 35 supra. 
The cases primarily have been decided under either the fourteenth amendment or the 
Supreme Court's supervisory power. See note 49-57 supra and accompanying text. 
Since the sixth amendment was not made applicable to the states until 1968, the law in 
this area is, as yet, inconclusive. See notes 41 supra & 64 infra. 
62. See notes 44-52 supra. 
63. See note 38 supra. 
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in aggregate, concluded that whether an individual's right to an im­
partial jury was violated depended upon the permissibility of under­
representation of a particular group on the jury venire. The 
resolution of the legality of excluding a particular group was there­
fore a condition precedent to determining the validity of an individ­
ual's claim that his right to an impartial jury had been violated. 
Fourteenth amendment influence is evidenced by this approach and 
the fair cross-section requirement is an obvious offspring of the four­
teenth amendment. 64 
C. Taylor 
The Supreme Court, in Taylor, adopted the fair cross-section 
requirement as fundamental to the sixth amendment's mandate of an 
impartial jury trial in criminal cases.65 In Taylor, a male, convicted 
of aggravated kidnapping, challenged the constitutionality of a Loui­
siana law which provided that women were to be excluded from jury 
service unless they filed a written statement expressly declaring the 
intent to serve.66 The specific issue before the Court was "whether 
the presence of a fair-cross-section of the community on venires, 
panels, or lists from which petit juries [were] drawn [was] essential to 
the fulfillment of the sixth amendment's guarantee of an impartial 
jury trial in criminal prosecutions."67 The Court concluded that "the 
fair-cross-section requirement [was] fundamental to the jury trial 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."68 The Court specifically 
found that this right had been violated where the result of the Loui­
siana provision was the exclusion from jury venires of fifty-three per­
cent of the citizens eligible for jury service.69 
Taylor is disturbing in the manner by which the Court arrived 
at the adoption of the fair cross-section requirement. The Court cor­
rectly relied on Duncan v. Louisiana,70 in which it held that the sixth 
64. It is the position of the dissent in both Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 539 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 370-71 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting), that the fair cross-section requirement is a fourteenth amendment doctrine. 
See text accompanying notes 74-82 infra. 
65. 419 U.S. at 530. 
66. The Louisiana statute provided that "[a) woman shall not be selected for jury 
service unless she has previously filed with the clerk of court of the parish in which she 
resides a written declaration ofher desire to be subject to jury service." LA. CODE CRIM. 
PRO. ANN. art. 402 (West 1966) (repealed 1975). 
67. 419 U.S. at 526. 
68. Id. at 530. 
69. Id. at 531. 
70. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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amendment right to an impartial jury was among those "fundamen­
tal principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our 
civil and political institutions"7! and is therefore applicable to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment.72 In Taylor, however, the 
Court mistakenly held that the fair cross-section requirement had 
developed as an essential component of the sixth amendment.13 
The dissent emphatically noted that the cases relied upon by the 
majority are more accurately characterized as fourteenth amend­
ment due process and equal protection cases.74 The Taylor dissent 
continued by citing the interest to be protected under Duncan: "[The 
jury trial for a serious offense is] essential for preventing miscar­
riages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all 
defendants."75 
The Taylor debate was continued in 1979 when the Court, in 
Duren v. Missouri,76 reversed a Missouri Supreme Court ruling that 
Taylor's mandate that a jury venire be chosen from a fair cross-sec­
tion of the community was not violated by a Missouri law.77 The 
statute required that women, who so requested, be granted an auto­
matic exemption from jury duty.78 Following Missouri's failure to 
rebut Duren's prima facie case, the Court declared the law 
71. Id. at 148 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932». 
72. Duncan was one in a line of cases providing to the states sixth amendment 
protections through the fourteenth amendment due process clause. E.g., Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (Texas statutes prohibiting testimony by coparticipant 
charged in the same crime held unconstitutional as violative of defendant's right to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for his defense); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 
386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967) (right to speedy trial declared fundamental and therefore 
applicable to states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (right of criminal defend­
ant in state court to cross-examine witness held to be fundamental right); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (indigent criminal defendant in state court held 
to have fundamental right to counsel). 
73. ''The unmistakable import of this Court's opinions, at least since 1940, ... and 
not repudiated by intervening decisions, is that the selection of a petit jury from a repre­
sentative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amend­
ment right to a jury trial." 419 U.S. at 528 (citation omitted). 
74. Id. at 539. 
75. Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
158 (1968». 
76. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
77. Id. at 370. 
78. UNo citizen shall be disqualified from jury service because of sex, but the court 
shall excuse any woman who requests exemption therefrom before being sworn as a ju­
ror." Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 226. This constitutional mandate is implemented by Mo. 
REV. STAT. § 494.031(2) (Supp. 1978) which states that U[t)he following persons, shall, 
upon their timely application to the court, be excused from service as a juror, either 
grand or petit; . . . (2) Any woman who requests exemption before being sworn as a 
juror. . . ." Id. 
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unconstitutional.79 
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority was not 
primarily interested in whether Duren had been given a fair trial as 
mandated by Duncan,80 but instead with whether women had "par­
ticipate[d] in the judicial process ...."81 He argued that this was 
neither a sixth amendment impartial jury concern nor a concern of 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, but rather was 
a fourteenth amendment equal protection issue.82 
Although Justice Rehnquist advocated the purging of the fair 
cross-section requirement from sixth amendment analysis, it is, in­
stead, the Court's unqualified adoption of the fourteenth amendment 
fair cross-section requirement in Taylor that leads to the difficulties 
manifested in decisions such as Bastarache.83 
IV. BASTARACHE 
In Bastarache, the supreme judicial court held that defendant's 
right to an impartial jury was not violated. This decision was made 
with the knowledge that only eighteen-and-one-half percent of the 
jury venire was composed of eighteen to thirty-four-year-olds eligi­
ble for jury duty in an area where thirty-six percent of the eligible 
individuals were in that age group.84 Bastarache was decided 
against defendant despite his being a member of the excluded age 
group. 
At the most fundamental level, these facts indicate that Bas­
tarache was deprived of his traditional right to a judgment by his 
peers. It is precisely the fair cross-section requirement, as adopted 
by Taylor, that imposes a fourteenth amendment concern upon the 
sixth amendment. The fair cross-section requirement does not ad­
dress the sixth amendment's concern for the right to an impartial 
jury. 
The court in Bastarache did acknowledge that determination of 
79. 439 u.s. at 369-70. 
80. 391 U.S. at 157-58. 
81. 439 U.S. at 371 note (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
82. Id. at 371. 
83. Taylor correctly recognized that the jury is a ''prophylactic vehicle" whose pur­
pose is to "guard against the exercise of arbitrary power." 419 U.S. at 530. On this basis, 
Taylor mandates that the state meet an increased burden once the initial establishment 
of a constitutional violation has been made. The fourteenth amendment compels the 
state to meet a rational relationship test to justify its laws in cases dealing with non­
suspect classifications, whereas the sixth amendment commands that "[t)he right to a 
proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds." Id. at 534. 
84. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2467, 414 N.E.2d at 988. 
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the existence of a group may be easier under the sixth amendment 
than under the fourteenth amendment. 85 The Bastarache court did 
this by echoing the Supreme Court's characterizations of the types of 
groups protected under both amendments.86 The difference between 
a distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes and an identifiable 
group for fourteenth amendment purposes is of dubious value. Al­
though Bastarache attempted to expand the protections provided 
under the sixth amendment, differentiation between distinctive and 
identifiable is not the proper means to that end. Adjectives describ­
ing groups to be protected historically have been used liberally and 
interchangeably. 
In Smith, an equal protection case, the Court used the adjective 
"qualified" to describe the type of group protected under the four­
teenth amendment: "For racial discrimination to result in the exclu­
sion from jury service of otherwise qual!fted groups not only violates 
our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with 
our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative 
government."87 
Hernandez v. Texas 88 involved an equal protection challenge 
made to the exclusion from the jury pool of individuals of Mexican 
origin. The characterization of the group protected under the four­
teenth amendment is what the Duren and Bastarache courts charac­
terized as a sixth amendment standard: "When the existence of a 
distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws, 
as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment 
not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the 
Constitution have been violated."89 
As recently as Taylor, a clear sixth amendment case, the Court 
held: "Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding 
ident!ftable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be 
squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial."90 The criteria 
used to determine whether a group is distinctive or identifiable is as 
enigmatic as the impact of the distinctions noted in Bastarache. This 
difficulty apparently is inherent in the process of distinguishing 
groups from nongroups, and only further exemplifies the need to 
85. Id. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992. 
86. Id. at 2475-76, 414 N.E.2d at 992. 
87. 311 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added). 
88. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
89. Id. at 478 (emphasis added). 
90. 419 U.S. at 530 (emphasis added). 
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amend the fair cross-section requirement when applied to situations 
as that in Bastarache. 
The frustration experienced in attempting to determine whether 
a distinct group objectively exists was voiced in the Duren dissent: 
This Court resorted to similar mystical incantations. . .[n]oting 
that the effect of excluding any large and identifiable segment of 
the community from jury service "is to remove from the jury room 
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the 
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable." ... [I]n 
Taylor v. Louisiana. . .the Court based its reversal of a. . . con­
viction largely on the transcendental notion that "a flavor, a dis­
tinct quality" was absent from his jury panel ....91 
In sixth amendment challenges to the composition of a particu­
lar jury pool, the solution to the problems raised by Bastarache lies 
in amending the fair cross-section requirement. 
v. CRITICISM 
Fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection con­
cerns permit an individual to bring a suit against the systematic ex­
clusion of a cognizable group even if he is not a member of that 
group. This is so because there is more at stake under the fourteenth 
amendment than protection of the individual. "When a grand or 
petit jury has been selected on an impermissible basis, the existence 
of a constitutional violation does not depend on the circumstances of 
the person making the claim ....The exclusion of ... any ... 
well-defined class of citizens, offends a number of related constitu­
tional values."92 
The fourteenth amendment analysis broadened the rights of an 
individual in order to afford greater judicial scrutiny of potential dis­
crimination against various groups. A requirement that the individ­
ual be a member of the group whose exclusion is being contested 
would obstruct protection of these fourteenth amendment interests. 
This principle has been extended to sixth amendment analysis.93 
The extension, however, has been mechanical and little considera­
tion has been given to the protections that the sixth amendment was 
designed to provide. The sixth amendment should afford the indi­
91. 439 U.S. at 372 note (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
92. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498 (1972). 
93. ''Thus if the Sixth Amendment were applicable here ... he would clearly have 
standing to challenge the systematic exclusion of any identifiable group from jury serv­
ice." Id. at 500. 
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vidual greater protections than does the fourteenth amendment.94 
The prime concern of the sixth amendment's impartial jury require­
ment is that the individual be given a fair trial. This is a question of 
fundamental fairness and fundamental rightS.95 When a violation of 
this sixth amendment right has been alleged, the facts and circum­
stances of each case must be examined and the test to determine a 
constitutional violation should be applied on a case-by-case basis. 
In both Taylor and J)uren, where appellant was not a member 
of the excluded group, the fair cross-section requirement provided 
protection against arbitrary jury selection procedures.96 In a situa­
tion such as Bastarache, however, where appellant is a member of 
the excluded group, the fair cross-section requirement acts as a re­
straint on the individual's right to an impartial jury trial. This is 
particularly so when the group to which the appellant belongs, is not 
recognized as a group for traditional fourteenth amendment 
purposes.97 
In a situation where the plaintiff is a member of the excluded 
group, the requirement that the group be "a 'distinctive' group in the 
community"98 should be eliminated from the three elements neces­
sary to establish a fair cross-section violation under Taylor and 
under the sixth amendment. The fair cross-section requirement, in 
such a situation, should demand a showing of a disproportionate 
representation on the jury venire over a period of time. The burden 
should then shift to the state to justify this underrepresentation by 
more than "merely rational grounds. "99 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The right of a criminal defendant to be tried by a jury selected 
from a fair cross-section of the community is a hybrid. It has 
evolved from judicial attempts to define the extent of the guarantees 
of the United States Constitution that provide that a criminal de­
fendant be tried by due process of law and by an impartial jury. 
In the dawn of this evolution, courts primarily were answering 
challenges brought under the fourteenth amendment. The roots of 
the fair cross-section requirement thus were drawn from the con­
cerns addressed by the fourteenth amendment's due process and 
94. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 530; see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 368. 
95. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 157-58. 
96. See notes 41 & 83 supra. 
97. See notes 24 & 25 supra. 
98. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2474, 414 N.E.2d at 992. 
99. See note 83 supra. 
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equal protection clauses. The Court in Strauder, Smith, Glasser, and 
Ballard considered the constitutional safeguards afforded blacks and 
women to ensure their equal participation in the jury system. The 
guarantees of a fair trial and due process of law primarily were de­
fined through the protections given to constitutionally recognized 
groups. 
In 1968 the Supreme Court, in JJuncan, extended the sixth 
amendment guarantee that a criminal defendant be given an impar­
tial jury trial to include trials in state courts. In 1975, against the 
historical backdrop of fourteenth amendment analysis, Taylor de­
fined the right to an impartial jury as being a right to be tried by a 
fair cross-section of the community. 
The sixth amendment mandate for an impartial jury, however, 
contemplates more than a right to a trial by jurors chosen from a fair 
cross-section of the community. The right to an impartial jury his­
torically was intended to guarantee a trial by a jury of one's peers. 
The focus of the fair cross-section requirement is upon the right of 
constitutionally recognized groups to equal representation on jury 
vemres. 
The potential inequitable application of the fair cross-section 
requirement to sixth amendment impartial jury cases is demon­
strated by Bastarache. In that case, a twenty-year-old defendant 
challenged the composition of the jury venire in Franklin County, 
Massachusetts, as underrepresenting individuals between the ages of 
eighteen and thirty-four. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged this 
circumstance and indicated that it had existed for a period of time. 
The dictates of the fair cross-section requirement, however, mandate 
a determination that the excluded group be constitutionally recog­
nizable before a violation of the requirement is found. The supreme 
judicial court indicated that although it may be easier to find a cog­
nizable group under sixth amendment analysis than under the four­
teenth amendment, the court decided to follow the mainstream of 
both state and federal decisions. The court held that age classifica­
tion did not constitute a cognizable group and therefore defendant 
was not deprived of his right to a trial by an impartial jury. 
When an individual challenges practices or laws that result in 
the exclusion from the jury venire of a group to which he belongs, 
the sixth amendment's protections demand an easing of the four­
teenth amendment requirements. The sixth amendment requires 
that the individual be given a fair trial by an impartial jury, a judg­
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ment by one's peers. The focus is on the treatment of the individual. 
The fair cross-section requirements should not become a barrier to 
sixth amendment claims, nor should the individual's relation to the 
protected group be a barrier to fourteenth amendment claims. 
James D. Horwitz 
